Worker e¤ort is a¤ected by incentives and threats. Contracts with limited employment protection have been identi…ed with greater work effort, this may stem from a variety of sources. This paper examines two distinct employment contract types that vary markedly in the degree of employment protection they a¤ord, temporary and permanent contracts.
Introduction
Worker e¤ort is a¤ected by incentives and threats. For example, incentives such as individual performance pay appear to increase e¤ort (Lazear 2000, Paarsch and Shearer 2000) . while there is evidence that limited employment protection also increases worker e¤ort (Riphahn 2004 , Ichino and Riphahn 2005 , Engellandt and Riphahn 2005 . This latter e¤ect, it has been argued, re ‡ects the e¤ect of workers' fear of job loss. However, work contracts with limited employment protection, such as temporary employment contracts, are often a vehicle for employers to screen workers prior to permanent employment (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002, Green and Leeves 2004) . Hence any e¤ect of lower employment protection on worker e¤ort need not necessarily be wholly determined by the threat of job loss. Instead, there may be some incentive to signal e¤ort in an attempt to gain more permanent employment.
1 Earlier research on employment protection e¤ects has not attempted to separately identify how threat and incentive e¤ects condition worker e¤ort. We attempt to separately measure these e¤ects.
Further complications exist when considering how (a lack of) employment protection a¤ects new employees. New employees face con ‡icting pressures on e¤ort and this is intensi…ed for those with less employment protection. If work with limited employment protection is an initial employment phase then, as noted by Ichino and Riphahn (2005) , increased worker e¤ort could be motivated by early career concerns. In the presence of uncertainty about the underlying ability of workers there will be an incentive to signal ability through increased e¤ort early in an employment spell (Holmstrom 1999) . This e¤ect could serve to confound any observed relationship between changes in employment protection after a given period of tenure and worker e¤ort. As a result, identi…cation of an employment protection e¤ect on worker e¤ort requires variation between tenure and the change in a worker's level of employment protection. Previous research has been unable to separately identify tenure and employment protection e¤ects on e¤ort as increases in employment protection are often linked explicitly to tenure by legislation Riphahn 2004, Ichino and .
In this study we can explicitly identify contract e¤ects separately from tenure e¤ects.
This paper examines two distinct employment contract types that vary markedly in the degree of employment protection they a¤ord, that is temporary and permanent contracts. We examine variations in a negative indicator of e¤ort, absenteeism, between workers on these two contract types using longitudinal personnel data for an entire public sector workforce. Variations in absenteeism has been previously used as a indicator of e¤ort in a number of studies covering areas such as employment protection e¤ects Riphahn 2004, Ichino and , promotion incentives (Audas, Barmby and Treble 2004) , and regional variations in shirking (Ichino and Maggi 2000) .
Our data is advantageous in a number of ways and enables us to substantially extend previous research which has been based on either survey data or data from a single …rm. In our data we are able to distinguish the e¤ects of changes in employment protection from tenure as temporary workers may gain permanent contracts after any length of tenure. The data covers a multi-organisation, multi-plant workforce, this allows us to observe workplace variations in the risk of job loss and the likelihood of temporary workers gaining a permanent contract. We use these variations to identify the in ‡uence of incentives and threats upon worker absence. We demonstrate that even after controlling for individual and workplace observable and unobservable characteristics, a worker on a temporary contract will, on average, take less absence than if they were employed on a permanent contract. The size of this di¤erence is in the order of 1.5 hours less absence per quarter. We extend this analysis by focusing on how tenure conditions the contract e¤ect on absenteeism. Using non-parametric tenure controls we demonstrate that tenure e¤ects dominate contract e¤ects for new workers, especially males. This, we argue, underlines the importance of separately identifying tenure and employment protection e¤ects on worker behaviour. Furthermore, it suggests that the observed association between employment protection and new workers'e¤ort are more likely to re ‡ect early career concerns than employment protection e¤ects per se. Finally, we seek to examine how contracts in ‡uence worker absence by examining the roles of threats (fear of job loss) and incentives (likelihood of gaining a permanent contract). Both in ‡uence worker absence behaviour, but our estimates suggest that incentives have a much stronger in ‡uence than threats for females, and vice versa for male temporary workers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some background on the public sector workforce, an outline of the data and examines the contribution of personal and workplace characteristics to the di¤erence in absenteeism between temporary and permanent workers. Section 3 examines contract e¤ects on absenteeism using a cohort of temporary workers, while section 4 investigate how these workers react to variations in the risk of job loss and the probability of gaining permanency. Section 5 concludes.
Background and Preliminary Evidence 2.1 The Queensland Public Sector Workforce
The data used in this study are based on the administrative personnel records of 
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There are large variations in the use of temporary contracts across Queensland State Government departments, and also variation in the rates of job loss (g) and transition to permanent contract status ( ). 
Contract E¤ects on Absenteeism: Preliminary Evidence
To examine the contribution of observable worker and workplace characteristics to the di¤erence between temporary and permanent absence we estimate the following model:
where A it is the hours of absence taken in quarter t by worker i, X i is a vector of personal characteristics (including tenure), W i is a vector of workplace and work-related characteristics (including the proportion of temporary workers in the department), w i is the hourly wage rate. If temporary contracts are used as part of a screening period then wages are likely to be endogenous. We investigate this hypothesis by re-estimating models with a one period lagged wage and also examine the robustness of other covariate estimates to the inclusion of the wage Looking at the coe¢ cient on permanent contract status in Table 3 , the OLS estimates suggest that just under 40% of the temporary to permanent di¤erence in absence reported in Table 1 was due to observable characteristics.
Nonetheless, a 3.4 hour per quarter di¤erence in absenteeism remains. Also note that tenure is postive and signi…cant, and this e¤ect is sizeable, just below 0.37 of an hour per year of tenure. Hence, omitting controls for tenure will tend to overstate the impact of employment protection on worker absence if workers with more employment protection have longer tenure on average. This also suggests that tenure e¤ects apply to permanent contracted workers, who face almost no risk of dismissal.
Our longitudinal data allows for the estimation of (1) with the inclusion of individual speci…c …xed e¤ects ( i ) to control for unobservable di¤erences in absence propensity between permanent and temporary contracted workers.
Time invariant personal characteristics are subsumed in the worker …xed e¤ects:
Estimates of are identi…ed in this model by workers moving between contract states. Column 4 of Table 3 provides estimates from maximum likelihood estimation of (2). The contract e¤ect on absence reduces by over an hour when compared to the OLS estimates, but remain at 2 hours per quarter and is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. These results demonstrate that there are di¤erences in temporary and permanent workers' absence behaviour that are not solely due to observable workplace and observable or unobservable personal characteristics.
However, the data that we have used so far in the analysis is pre-sorted insofar as individuals have already been assigned into temporary and permanent contracts within the public sector labour force. Previous research on the role of temporary employment as a port of entry into permanent employment suggests this will not be a random process (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002, Green and Leeves 2004) . For example, if there is a screening process of temporary workers then one may expect the poorer job matches to be terminated …rst. As a result estimates of from (1) or (2) may be biased.
To address these issues of pre-sorting and selection, we focus on a cohort of new workers who enter the public sector. This is the empirical strategy adopted to examine the e¤ects of the change in employment contract type (from temporary to permanent) on absenteeism.
Contract E¤ects on Absenteeism: Cohort Evidence
The cohort used is all temporary workers who entered the public sector workforce during the …rst year of our MOHRI data. The cohort is selected in this way in an attempt to maximise the sample size of temporary contracted entrants whilst allowing su¢ cient time to observe their subsequent absence behaviour.
We then follow these workers for up to 14 additional quarters, subject to their remaining in the public sector workforce. Sample means for the cohort are reported in the Appendix as Table A1 . Ichino and Moretti (2006) identify marked gender di¤erences in absence behaviour, particularly in the early stages of employment, as a result sample means, and all subsequent cohort analyses, are disaggregated by gender.
INSERT FIGURE 1
The key interest is in how absence behaviour changes with contract status.
Figure 1 presents temporary workers'absence normalised to the time at which they transit to permanent employment. Speci…cally, time 0 on the x-axis refers to the quarter in which the worker made the transition from a temporary to a permanent contract. As a result period 0 covers a quarter within which we do not perfectly observe the timing of the transition between contract types. Hence we do not know exactly how much of the absence in this period occurred whilst the worker was on a temporary contract. Thus, a better comparison is between the periods denoted -1 and 1. The raw di¤erence in absenteeism calculated in this way reveals marked gender di¤erences in the contract e¤ect on absence.
For males, there is only a minor increase in absence of 0.84 hours per quarter, in contrast for females the di¤erences is 2.62 hours per quarter. An alternative approach is to look at mean di¤erences in absenteeism over the whole period before and after transition, which reveals a more consistent mean di¤erence of 5.06 hours and 4.18 hours for males and females, respectively.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Figure 2 plots mean absence behaviour over time for the cohort of temporary entrants (i.e. the x-axis runs from the quarter of entry through to the last quarter that they are observed). It is immediately noticeable that temporary workers take very little absence in the …rst two quarters. There is a marked increase in absence after this time, which is not associated with any systematic contract change for the cohort. This tenure pattern could re ‡ect worker incentives to take less absence early in their career because monitoring is likely to be higher since supervisors have little knowledge of their abilities (Holmstrom 1999 Using the model in equation (1) we now examine more formally if workers' absence increases signi…cantly following a change in contract status from temporary to permanent. An advantage of shifting to a cohort approach is that we can explicitly examine transition to permanent employment at di¤erent tenure points. As noted above, a di¢ culty with our data is that we only observe quar-terly intervals (not the actual date of transition). Hence, in this approach we imperfectly observe tenure at time of transition. We exclude the quarter of transition from the analysis as during this quarter we cannot precisely assign contract status. 5 Finally, absenteeism is likely to have a seasonal component, the underlying rates of actual sickness may not be stationary. We therefore introduce controls for the quarter of the year, and omit the …rst quarter (January to March).
We estimate two variants of equation (1) for the cohort by OLS and report the results in Table 4 . First, we include our standard set of controls but exclude tenure (columns 2 to 5). Second, we repeat the exercise with a control for tenure These estimates of the contract e¤ect on absenteeism may be biased by se-5 In all estimations this has a small positive e¤ect on the estimate of the contract status e¤ect. Additionally, all estimates are also robust to the exclusion of wages, or the inclusion of lagged wages. 6 The role of tenure on absence is considered in more detail in Section 4 below.
lection e¤ects related to the retention of temporary workers. Speci…cally, there may be some relationship between workers'unobserved absence propensity and their likelihood of separating from the public sector. For instance, workers with lower absence propensities may have better outside options and hence be more likely to quit the public sector prior to gaining a permanent contract. In this case, the assignment of permanent contracts to temporary workers may involve a degree of adverse selection. Investigation of absence levels of temporary workers who separate reveals that absence levels were higher, by approximately 2.5 hours, than those who remained in the public sector. Importantly, this …g-ure did not vary markedly between those who quit and those who were …red.
This does not support the argument that the assignment of temporary workers to permanent contracts may be a¤ected by adverse selection. In addition, temporary workers who gain permanency may, in terms of their propensity to be absent, be unobservably di¤erent from those who do not gain permanency.
Under the assumption that workers absence propensity (preferences) are time invariant we can utilise the panel structure of MOHRI and include individual level …xed e¤ects to allow for these individual variations.
Moreover, workplaces are likely to vary in terms of absenteeism levels due to characteristics that are not directly observed in data. For instance, there may be di¤erences in departmental management practices in relation to absence management and/or treatment of temporary workers. Thus, we introduce controls for unobservable workplace characteristics. Ideally, we would include a …xed e¤ect for every workplace in the public sector. However, this would re-quire the inclusion of over 1500 …xed e¤ects. This is computationally intensive therefore we include …xed e¤ects for each of the 51 departments in the public sector (where Z ij is a dummy that is equal to one if worker i is in department j at time t). 7 This leads to our third model:
Where i is an individual speci…c time invariant …xed e¤ect. Estimation of (3) by MLE is reported in the …nal four columns of Table 4 and leads to a reduced estimate of temporary to permanent di¤erential of 1.72 hours for males and a slight increase to 1.56 hours for females. When compared to the OLS estimates, this suggest that there is some explanatory role for unobservable di¤erences in absence propensities between temporary workers who gain permanency and those who do not, and/or unobserved workplace characteristics, but these e¤ects are not su¢ cient to change the general …ndings. Estimating (3) and excluding departmental …xed e¤ects, indicates that the changes in the estimates of contract e¤ects on absence between the OLS estimates and the …xed e¤ects estimates are almost solely due to the inclusion of controls for individual …xed e¤ects.
Across departmental variations in unobservable characteristics do not have a signi…cant additional in ‡uence on the conditional e¤ect of permanent contracts on individual absenteeism.
Two additional potential sources of bias of these estimates of contract e¤ects 7 Due to departmental reshu-es and amalgamations there are never 51 departments at one point in time, generally there are 32-40 departments in operation within any given quarter.
were examined. First, peer absenteeism behaviour may in ‡uence a worker's absence decisions Maggi 2000, Bradley, Green and Leeves 2007) . With respect to employment contracts this could be important if, in the presence of a di¤erence in absenteeism between temporary and permanent workers, temporary workers tend to be grouped together in workplaces. This would cause an upward bias in estimates of the permanent contract e¤ect on absenteeism.
We investigate this by introducing a control for average workplace absenteeism (excluding the ith individual) in the current period. Estimating this model does not have a marked impact on the estimated permanent contract e¤ect on absenteeism. We also introduce one quarter lagged average workplace absenteeism (again excluding the ith individual), but again this has no marked e¤ect on the estimated permanent contract e¤ect.
Second, temporary and permanent workers may, on average, work in di¤erent geographic areas which vary in terms of underlying absence probability due to di¤erences in factors such as travel to work times and regional variations in sickness. We introduce postcode level …xed e¤ects to capture time invariant location di¤erences. The estimates of the permanent contract e¤ect from these models suggest that the estimated contract e¤ect on absenteeism is robust to variations in the geographical location of work of temporary and permanent workers.
In this section we have sought to quantify the impact of contract status on absence behaviour by examining workers who enter the public sector labour force on temporary contracts and contrasting their absence behaviour to that when they gain a permanent contract. The evidence presented suggests that approximately 63% of the observed overall di¤erence in hours of absence between the contract states of 5.06 for males can be explained by observed and unobserved personal and workplace characteristics. For females the corresponding …gures are an overall observed di¤erence of 4.18 hours of which 62% can be explained.
Tenure and Contract E¤ects on Absenteeisms
We now consider more closely how the likely incentives for new workers to adjust their absence behaviour according to length of tenure interacts with contract status. For instance, in the presence of uncertainty about the underlying ability of workers there will be an incentive to signal ability by lowering absenteeism early in an employment spell (Holmstrom 1999) . Furthemore, the data presented in Figure 2 suggests a non-linear relationship between absence and tenure. We seek to examine this …rst by re-estimating (3) with a dummy variable included for each quarter of tenure (omitting the …rst quarter of tenure). Contract e¤ect estimates from this model are included as table 5, in addition we also report full tenure-quarter point estimates (omitting quarter one). Whilst a positive permanent contract e¤ect on absenteeism remains, these are of a small magnitude, around 0.3 to 0.5 of an hour per quarter, and no longer statistically signi…cant at standard levels. However, there is a statistically signi…cant relationship between the quarterly tenure dummies and absenteeism. One interpretation of this result is that tenure e¤ects on absence, such as a desire to signal e¤ort early in an employment relationship, dominate any impact of employment protection.
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However, some caution should be used in interpreting these results in this way. The tenure controls introduced may, in e¤ect, over-control if new workers on temporary contracts have a greater incentive to signal e¤ort earlier than other workers. In this sense, the tenure dummies may be collinear with the control for contract type. A more correct counterfactual is between the absence behaviour of new workers where temporary contracts are not used and the situation where temporary contracted workers may be seeking to gain permanency.
In this case the conditional (on observables and unobservables) absence-tenure estimates could be compared between these two groups to investigate if temporary contracts condition workers' absence behaviour across tenure. In our data, we do not directly observe these two scenarios. However, some individuals enter the public sector workforce directly onto permanent contracts. We construct a cohort of these entrants analguous to the temporary worker sample. We then examine the absence-tenure pro…les of this cohort. The intuition is that if the conditional absence-tenure gradient reported in table 5 is primarily due to temporary workers seeking to gain permanency, rather than more general early career concerns, then the absence-tenure gradient should be distinct for workers who are initially on permanent contracts.
We re-estimate (3) for the permanent at start cohort (with the control for contract type omitted) and again include a dummy variable for each quarter of tenure. Table 6 presents the tenure estimates for the cohort of workers who started on permanent contracts. It is clear that there is still an absence-tenure gradient, although the results become imprecise for later tenure females. These results suggest that there are tenure e¤ects on absence that exist in isolation from any in ‡uence of a desire to gain permanency on absence behaviour.
To this point, we have demonstrated that early career workers who enter the workforce on a temporary contract increase their absenteeism after a move to a permanent contract. This e¤ect survives the introduction of controls for individual and workplace observables and unobservables. However, estimates that seek to control for the non-linear relationship between tenure and absence suggest that much of this e¤ect may be explainable by more general early career concerns. Comparison of absence behaviour between workers who enter on temporary contracts, and hence face concerns related to a lack of employment protection, and those who enter on permanent contracts, where this concern is not present, support this view. However, contracts with a lack of employment protection may condition worker e¤ort in two distinct ways. First, these workers may work harder (take less absence) to lower their risk of job loss. Second, these workers may increase e¤ort (lower absence) to increase their chances of gaining promotion to a permanent contract. We now consider how absence responds to the threat of job loss and the incentive of gaining permanency. The next section outlines a theoretical model indicating how these threats and incentives would a¤ect the absence decision of temporary workers. This provides some a priori expectations on their likely sign, which is subsequently empirically tested in Section 6.
A Model of Threat and Incentive E¤ects on Absence
This section provides a brief outline of the absence decision for temporary workers, and the role of threats (i.e. the risk of job loss) and incentives (the probability of gaining a permanent contract). Full derivations are available in the Appendix.
Assume that a workers' utility is derived from e¤ort and absence. Work e¤ort causes disutility and absence lowers overall e¤ort, hence absence (A) is positively related to utility. Wages are also positively related to utility.
The discounted utility of temporary employment is given by:
where the discount rate is r, V ET the value of being employed on a temporary contract and V U the value of being unemployed. A standard assumption in models of worker absence is that the risk of dismissal is increasing in absence.
Here the main source of separation risk for temporary workers is not having their contract renewed. The variable g is the extent to which temporary contracts within a department are subject to renewal as they lapse, where g = 0 implies all contracts are at risk of non-renewal as they lapse and g = 1 means all contracts are renewed as they lapse and 0 < g < 1: The probability of renewal is a positive convex function of worker absenteeism C(A) (C = > 0 and C == > 0).
The worker chooses absence to maximise utility from temporary employment when faced with the possibility of non-renewal and unemployment. Solution of this problem identi…es that absence will be decreasing as job loss risk increases
E¤ort levels may be a¤ected by the likelihood of gaining permanent employment. The expected discounted utility of permanent employment (rV EP ) is given by:
The probability that a worker is o¤ered a permanent position is represented by (1 )C(A i ). The probability of conversion is a function of absenteeism C(A). The variable represents the proportion of temporary contracts within a department that will be converted into permanent positions. If = 0 then no contracts are subject to conversion and if = 1 all temporary contracts will potentially be made permanent, lies in the range 0 < < 1 (see Table 2 column 4 for the actual values in our data). As before the worker will choose absenteeism to maximise utility from obtaining permanent employment based on a comparison of the marginal bene…ts and marginal cost. Solution of this problem suggests workers will decrease absence as level of conversions increase.
Workers do not directly observe g and , instead expectations would be based on information within the department, including recent job loss and permanency conversion rates. In the next section, we use the cohort data on temporary workers and exploit variations in renewal and conversion rates across departments in our dataset to examine the role of these two factors in in ‡uencing worker absence.
Threats and Incentives: Empirical Evidence
We now formally consider the e¤ects of job loss risk and the probability of conversion to permanency in conditioning temporary workers'absence behaviour.
We proceed under the assumption that job loss risk and the probability of conversion to permanency have separate and additive e¤ects on worker absence.
This leads us to estimate equation (3) with the addition of two extra terms.
The issue then arises as to how to specify these terms in our estimating equation. The contemporaneous rate of g (risk of job loss) and (rate of conversion to permanent employment) are not directly observable to the worker when considering how much e¤ort to exert. Hence, we consider that workers base their expectations on recent history of these characteristics of the work environment. 8 We examine the e¤ects of both departmental and workplace variations in g and , using lagged values of the rate of temporary contract non-renewal and the conversion rate of temporary workers to permanent employment and use these to proxy g and , respectively. These lagged values will be observed with some imprecision by workers as not all personnel information may be available in the public domain. Nevertheless, our expectation is that absenteeism will be negatively related to the risk of job loss and the conversion to permanency rates.
There is no natural lag period to choose, so we experiment with models with a one lag period and an average of two lagged periods. 9 The calculation of g and exclude the ith individual. This leads to the following empirical speci…cations:
INSERT TABLE 7 where g = (g t 1 + g t 2 )=2 and = ( t 1 + t 2 )=2. These results are reported in Table 7 . Whilst there is some variation according to the lag speci…cation used, the covariate estimates support the view that both increases in the risk of job loss and the probability of conversion to permanency decrease absenteeism (increase e¤ort). It is worth emphasising that these models include departmental …xed e¤ects, hence the estimated e¤ects of risk of job loss and conversion to permanency are identi…ed by variation in g and over time. Importantly, these estimated threat and incentive e¤ects are robust to the choice of tenure speci…cation (i.e. a continuous variable or quarterly dummies).
Previously it was shown ( Table 2 ) that g and are positively correlated.
To examine any e¤ect this may have on our estimates, we ran regressions with both g and entered separately. The estimated e¤ects remained robust to these alternative speci…cations, which suggests that the conditions for including these variables as separate and additive determinants of absenteeism are maintained in our data. Despite the statistical signi…cance of g and in many of our speci…ca-tions, their inclusion does not generally have a marked e¤ect on the estimated overall permanent contract e¤ect on absenteeism for males. For females, the permanent contract e¤ect becomes marginally signi…cant with one lag period controls, and signi…cant at the one percent level when the two period average controls are included. The results for g and suggest that male absence is more sensitive to threat of job loss whereas female absence is more sensitive to the chance of gaining permanancy. This illustrates how temporary workers may be subject to con ‡icting motivations to exert more e¤ort.
In further unreported tests, we interacted these two variables with a dummy indicating permanent employment. We would expect that neither of these variables should in ‡uence absenteeism once a worker gains a permanent contract.
Indeed these interaction terms were statistically insigni…cant and approximately zero, whilst the sign and size of the coe¢ cients on separation risk, probability of permanency and the permanent contract e¤ect were una¤ected
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was twofold. Firstly, we sought to disentangle the e¤ects of employment protection changes on worker e¤ort separately from any tenure e¤ects on e¤ort in recognition of the fact that e¤ort will be conditioned by tenure through in ‡uences unrelated ot contract status. Secondly, we identify and estimate how particular threats and incentives in the work environment a¤ect the e¤ort of temporary workers with lower employment protection. We exploit our multi departmental dataset to show that threat and incentive signals in the work environment directly in ‡uence temporary worker e¤ort Utilising a cohort of new workers we demonstrate that a large proportion of the di¤erential in temporary and permanent worker rates of absenteeism can be explained by observed and unobserved personal and workplace characteristics.
In particular, the positive e¤ect of tenure on absence is large. Including nonparametric controls for tenure leads to the e¤ect of a permanent contract on absence becoming statistically insigni…cant. This tenure e¤ect we associate with early career concerns and importantly appears to apply equally to permanent workers who face virtually no threat of dismissal. Hence, we characterise this as an incentive e¤ect that applies to all workers.
It is known that threats and incentives are also generated through condi-tions in the work environment (Wilson and Peel 1991, Audas, Barmby and Treble 2004) . We focused on two likely sources for temporary workers; their chances of job loss and the opportunity for conversion to permanent employment. These are found to condition temporary workers to exert more e¤ort (take less absence), the former as a threat and the latter as an incentive. Importantly, unlike the change in employment status, these e¤ects are robust to our tenure controls. Thus it appears that temporary worker's e¤ort is less determined by contract status per se than how and to what extent that employment contracts are used as part of personnel policies in the organisation. Source: MOHRI data. *, ** indicate statistical signi…cance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Controls for ethnicity, disability, occupation, age, tenure, wage rate and seasonal dummies included but not reported. If a temporary worker is not renewed then the value of being in unemployment is de…ned by income when unemployed b (same for all workers) and the probability of …nding another job multiplied by the di¤erence in value between employment and unemployment.
The level of absenteeism which will maximise rV 
To determine the e¤ect of higher levels of non-renewal on absenteeism we need to evaluate equation (13) using implicit di¤erentiation, which gives the expression dA dg = r + (1 g)C 00 (A)(w T + A b) > 0
If a worker is in work then (w T +A b) > 0 and workers will decrease absence as the percentage of jobs that potentially may not be renewed increases.
where the discount rate is r and the value of being employed on a temporary contract is V ET . The variable g is the degree to which temporary contracts within his/her department are subject to evaluation of worker e¤ort as they lapse, where g = 0 implies all contracts are evaluated for renewal as they lapse and g = 1 means all contracts are terminated as they lapse and 0 < g < 1: The probability of renewal is a function of worker absenteeism C(A) (C = > 0 and C == > 0). The variable g is not directly observable for the worker but could be estimated from recent histories of termination and renewal in the department.
Equation (4) states that the discounted utility of employment for a worker is equal to the instantaneous utility of employment, the …rst two terms of the right hand side, and the loss in utility from the probability of non-renewal, the second term. The loss in utility is equal to the di¤erence between the value of being unemployed (V U ) and the value of employment. It is assumed that all workers are hired initially on temporary contracts before conversion to permanent contracts. The discounted utility of permanent employment is given by:
The value of being employed on a permanent contract is V EP :The probability that a worker is o¤ered a conversion to a permanent position is represented by (1 )C(A i ). The probability of of conversion is a function of absenteeism C(A). The variable represents the proportion of temporary contracts within the department where the worker is located that are being evaluated for conversion to permanent positions. The evaluation of by the worker could be based on the recent levels of conversion to permanent employment within the department. If = 0 then no contracts are subject to evaluation and if = 1 all contracts are subject to evaluation for permanency, 0 < < 1: The worker will choose absenteeism to maximise rV
EP i
which, for all workers, is given by the condition:
Equation (6) illustrates how a worker will take absence until the marginal bene…t is equated to the marginal cost We deal separately with the evaluation decisions relating to temporary and permanent work and temporary work and 
This expression can be combined with equation 6 to obtain the condition: S = r + (1 g)C(A) + (1 )C(A) ((1 )C 0 (A))(w P w T ) = 0 (20)
To determine the e¤ect of higher rates of conversion to permanent positions on absenteeism we need to evaluate this equation which through implicit di¤erentiation gives the expression dA d = r + (1 g)C(A) (1 g)C 0 (A) + (1 )C 0 (A) (w P w T )((1 )C 00 (A)) > 0 (21)
From this we see that workers will decrease absence as the proportion of jobs that could be potentially converted to permanent employment increases.
